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L.A. LAW SCHOOL
Excerpts from an Original Screenplay by Jan C. Costello*
FADE IN:
EXT. LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL-DAY
PALMER walks from the parking structure towards the Oak Tree
Quadrangle behind Merrifield Hall. She approaches a group of
casually dressed students sitting on one of the concrete ledges that
surround the oak tree. She appears to ask for directions, and one of
the students points her towards the Burns Building. Palmer proceeds
up the Frank 0. Gehry narrowing stairs and into the Burns Building.
INT. COSTELLO'S OFFICE
COSTELLO sits at her computer and types. There is a knock at the
door.
COSTELLO
Just a minute.
Costello walks to the door and opens it.
COSTELLO
Yes?
PALMER
Professor Costello, you don't know me, but I used to work
with Dr. Stan Ziegler,' and he always said that if I had any
legal or ethical questions you were the one to see. My name
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
1. This Essay is dedicated to the memory of Stan W. Ziegler, Ph.D. (1950-1995), a
talented, conscientious, and ethical therapist, and my good friend for over twenty years.
Stan volunteered his friends' time and expertise as generously as he did his own. He once
cheerfully informed me that, upon seizing the microphone at a conference on legal and
ethical issues, he had given my telephone number to about 150 therapists and told them,
"If you have any questions, just call Jan." Mercifully, only a few of them have.
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is Dr. Jennifer Palmer and I'm in practice here in Califor-
nia.2 I'm concerned about something that has occurred with
one of my patients, and I'd like to discuss it with you. But
before I do, uh-you will keep this conversation confidential,
won't you?
COSTELLO
Since you're consulting me as an attorney, you're my client
and this whole conversation is privileged. Just as you do, I
have an ethical obligation to keep confidential my client's
communications-with very rare exceptions.
PALMER
Well, here's my problem: My patient, Ben Jones, has
confessed to me that he committed a murder. An innocent
man, Frank Smith, is going to be executed for that same
murder next Friday. Ben could stop the execution by
turning himself in, and I know he's thinking about it, but
what if he doesn't? Ethically, should I disclose his confes-
sion to somebody who can stop the execution? And if I do
disclose it, can Ben Jones sue me? Could I lose my profes-
sional license?
COSTELLO
Should you disclose Ben's confession? That's an ethical
question, and while I could talk you through the pros and
cons,3 you ultimately have to decide that for yourself. Your
2. The hypothetical did not indicate where the therapist was in practice. I added this
fact because California law is well established as to the patient's general right to
confidentiality and privacy under the state constitution. See Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183
Cal. App. 3d 836, 841-42, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (1986). As to the duty of the therapist
to disclose confidential communications where necessary to avert harm, see Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). Most
important, however, is that the scope of the so-called dangerous patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, California Evidence Code § 1024, has been recently
clarified in a series of decisions by the California Supreme Court. See Menendez v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 435, 834 P.2d 786, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 (1992) (interpreting its
earlier decisions in People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583,789 P.2d 127,268 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1990)
and People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 809 P.2d 290, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991)), The
"retrospective" application of the dangerous patient exception to compel testimony about
a murder confession like the one in this hypothetical is a real possibility.
3. As could anyone who has read the following masterful essays: Philip J. Candilis
& Paul S. Applebaum, A Confession of Murder: The Psychiatrist's Dilemma, 29 LOY. L.A.
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other questions-if you disclose Ben's confession can he
successfully sue you and whether you can lose your li-
cense-raise several legal issues. What the consequences of
your disclosure would be would depend upon whether the
disclosure was lawful.
PALMER
That's really what I need-legal advice. I mean, if you tell
me that the law requires me to disclose, I don't have much
of a choice. While I know that some therapists do refuse to
comply with the law and take their chances on being
punished, I don't see myself defying a court order. And if
you tell me that I don't have to disclose, and that Ben could
sue me if I do ... I've only been in private practice a few
years and I don't have a lot of money.., maybe I shouldn't
let fear of a lawsuit keep me from doing the right thing...
but it might ... and yet the thought of an innocent man
dying, when I could stop it...
COSTELLO
I know this is an agonizing decision, and I'll do my best to
help you by giving you my legal opinion. The two legal
issues are: First, do you have a duty to disclose the confes-
sion? Second, in the absence of such a duty, does the law
give you the discretion to disclose Ben's confession without
violating either his right to confidentiality or your profes-
sional code of ethics?
If you made the disclosure because the law requires it,
you certainly would have not violated Ben's right to confi-
dentiality.4 Ben could still sue you, but not successful-
ly-and that's an important distinction. If you ask, "Can he
sue me?", the answer is, "Sure. Anybody can file suit
against anybody for any reason." The real question is, "Can
he successfully sue me?"
L. REv. 1691 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, "I'll Give You Shelter From the Storm": Privilege,
Confidentiality and Confessions of Crime, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV 1699 (1996); Robert
Sadoff, Ethical Obligations for the PsychiatrisL" Confidentiality, Privilege, and Privacy in
Psychiatric Treatment, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv 1709 (1996); Daniel W. Shuman, The Case of
the Confidential Confession. Psychiatry, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv 1717 (1996).
4. See infra note 39.
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As for losing your license, I need to first know, Dr.
Palmer, are you a psychiatrist or psychologist?
PALMER
A psychiatrist.
COSTELLO
So you're bound by the American Psychiatric Association's
(APA) ethical code' and can release confidential informa-
tion only with the authorization of the patient or "under
proper legal compulsion."
6
PALMER
Ben hasn't given consent, and I haven't gotten a court order
or anything, so I can't disclose his confession.
COSTELLO
Not so fast. A court order isn't the only form of proper
legal compulsion. Before we look at whether Ben has given
consent or what proper legal compulsion means, we need to
determine whether Ben's communications with you are
confidential in the first place. And by the way, because I'll
use both terms in our discussion, "confidentiality" refers to
your general obligation not to disclose a patient's communi-
cations to you without their consent. "Privilege" refers to
your patient's right to prevent you from disclosing those
communications in a court of law. So as to the same
statement your patient made to you, the existence of a
privilege would operate to prevent you from repeating it in
5. According to the Principles of Medical Ethics, "[a] physician ... shall safeguard
patient confidences within the constraints of the law." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE
TO PSYCHIATRY § 4, at 2 (1984). In addition, "[a] psychiatrist may release confidential
information only with the authorization of the patient or under proper legal compulsion."
Id. at 6 (annotations to § 4).
6. William J. Winslade and Judith Wilson Ross, however, point out that the
"[a]nnotations state, first, that the psychiatrist 'must be circumspect in the information that
he/she chooses to disclose.'" William J. Winslade & Judith Wilson Ross, Privacy,
Confidentiality and Autonomy in Psychotherapy, 64 NEB. L. REv. 578, 608 (1985).
Additionally, "[p]sychiatrists are permitted to release confidential information in the event
that it is necessary to protect the patient or the community from imminent danger." Id.
at 612.
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a judicial forum, while the duty of confidentiality would
apply to ionjudicial disclosures.
PALMER
I think I understand. Confidentiality is what would prevent
me from calling, say, the governor, and telling him to stop
the execution because Ben confessed to the murder.' And
privilege means that if I were called to testify in court about
Ben's statements to me, Ben could prevent me from
answering.
8
COSTELLO
Yes, that's right. And in order to know whether confidenti-
ality or privilege applies here, we need to determine: Is the
confession Ben made to you a "confidential communica-
tion"?9 This will depend in part on the context of Ben's
therapy with you and on his expectation of confidentiality.
Tell me a little about Ben Jones and how he came to begin
therapy with you.
PALMER
Ben has a serious substance abuse problem. He's been in
and out of prison over the last twenty years, usually for
drug-related offenses or small-time robberies to support his
drug habit. The last time he was in prison he received some
7. A patient's communications to his therapist as well as the therapist's "impressions
and diagnosis, and other details of his professional relationship with [the patient] fall
within the zone of privacy protected by" the California Constitution. Cutter v.
Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 843, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (1986) (referring to CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1).
8. "[T]he patient.., has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another
from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist.. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1995).
9. The California Evidence Code defines "confidential communication between
patient and psychotherapist" as
information.., transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist in the
course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the
patient is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those
who are present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, or those
to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for.., the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the psychotherapist is consulted, and [this] includes a
diagnosis made and the advice given by the psychotherapist in the course of that
relationship.
I&e § 1012 (West 1995).
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psychiatric counseling, and when he was released he was
referred to me to continue weekly therapy sessions.
COSTELLO
Are you being paid by the state, or is Ben a private patient?
PALMER
I'm not paid by the state. I signed up with a referral
program to treat criminal offenders with substance abuse
problems. Ben and the other patients from that program are
private patients, and I charge them on a sliding scale.
COSTELLO
Is Ben on parole?
PALMER
I'm not sure. Why?
COSTELLO
If the therapy is a condition of parole, he may expect that
you will prepare reports on his progress for his parole
officer. In that case he would not have the expectation of
privacy that is essential for a privilege."0 You could dis-
close his confession to his parole officer without violating
any right of confidentiality.
PALMER
He hasn't said anything about my sending reports to a
parole officer.
COSTELLO
So much for that argument. If he isn't on parole, and has no
expectation that you will report to his parole officer-
10. In "real life" it is unlikely that Ben would be seeing a therapist as a private
patient, especially since he is a drug addict who needs to commit robberies to support his
habit and probably cannot afford Dr. Palmer's hourly fees. If he were referred for therapy
after discharge from prison, it would likely be as a condition of parole, and there would
be some arrangement, identified to Ben in advance, for sending reports of his therapy to
his parole officer. But since in that case we wouldn't have the fun of working through the
entire hypothetical, I have created a factual situation that ensures the communication to
Dr. Palmer was confidential and privileged at the outset.
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PALMER
All I know is that he started seeing me right after he got out
of prison.
COSTELLO
Do you think his motive in starting therapy was a sincere
desire to be helped, or just fear of going back to prison? It's
been suggested that there is no privilege if the patient's
"dominant purpose" for seeing the therapist is not a sincere
desire for treatment." But the California Supreme Court-
in a case called Menendez which I'll tell you more about
soon-said that in determining whether the psychotherapist-
patient privilege applies, the motives of the patient and
therapist are not as important as their actions.2 Ben may
be hoping to stay out of prison, and you may be hoping to
pay off your mortgage with his fees, but so long as you both
do the tasks required by therapy, it's likely that a court will
find the relationship is privileged. Does Ben appear to
sincerely participate in therapy, or do you think he's just
using you?
PALMER
I think he's sincere in wanting to stay out of jail and sincere
in wanting to get off drugs, but he's not making very good
progress. He participates as much as most of my patients,
and many of my patients only come because someone in
their life-their spouse or their employer-says they have to
11. See, eg., People v. Cabral, 12 Cal. App. 4th 820,827-28, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 870
(1993) (holding that a letter written to a psychologist in which the defendant stated that
he molested his daughter was not privileged because defendant's dominant purpose in
writing the letter was to avoid a prison term and not to obtain treatment).
12. In Menendez v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 435, 454, 834 P.2d 786, 797-98, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 92, 103-04 (1992), the court stated:
[Miotive is largely, if not totally, immaterial. It appears that in virtually all
psychotherapy, what motivates the participants is not psychotherapy for its own
sake. For example, the psychotherapist is sometimes motivated by self-interest,
as where he earns his living solely through his practice. For his part, the patient
is sometimes motivated by self-preservation, as where he struggles to resist the
temptation of suicide or antisocial conduct. As a general matter, the dispositive
fact is what the participants do, not why.
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or else. I don't really like the idea of saying that because
somebody has mixed motives for entering therapy, there's no
privilege.
COSTELLO
Well, it was just a thought. I'm trying to explore all the
ways which will enable you to make the disclosure if you
want to-and if your relationship with Ben wasn't privileged
at all, that would certainly help. But I agree it's a weak
argument.
So let's assume that the confession is a confidential
communication and that privilege applied at the time it was
made. But does it still apply? Ben may have already
waived the privilege-at least as to the confession of
murder-by talking about it with somebody other than you.
Did he tell you whether he has confessed to anybody else?
PALMER
He's got a public defender, Claire Hopewell. He told me
that he's talked to her about the murder. And he also
talked to a man named Samuels, some kind of clergyman,
whom he knew as a child.
COSTELLO
Each of those conversations can qualify for its own privi-
lege-the first as attorney-client," the second as clergyman-
penitent. 4 So neither of those disclosures constitute a
waiver of his privilege. 5 The fact that Ben seems to be
disclosing his murder only in privileged contexts suggests
that he views therapy with you in the same light and expects
you to keep his disclosure confidential.
I think we need to assume that a court would find
initially that your therapist-patient relationship with Ben is
privileged. So that means you are bound by the APA ethics
code to preserve the confidentiality of Ben's communica-
tions, unless under proper legal compulsion. If you have a
legal duty to disclose Ben's confession, then doing so would
13. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1995).
14. I- §§ 1030-1034.
15. "A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver of any privilege." Id. § 912(c).
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not violate the APA ethics code. So now let's consider
whether you have such a duty.
16
PALMER
You mean like under Tarasoff?'7 I thought about that. I
know that if a patient makes a threat of future harm to an
identifiable victim, the therapist has a duty to warn the
victim and call the police. That's what the state law says,
right?'
8
COSTELLO
You are correct that under California state law, the thera-
pist's duty under Tarasoff is satisfied by warning the victim
and calling the police. The original decision imposed a
broader responsibility to take "whatever other steps are
reasonably necessary.' 9  But you can see how it would
leave the therapist too vulnerable. How would you know
what was reasonably necessary until after the fact, when the
harm either was or wasn't averted? So the California
legislature spelled out what a therapist has to do to satisfy
Tarasoff.
16. Exceptions [to the duty of confidentiality] are usually found: (1) where the
patient puts his mental state in issue in other litigation (2) where there is a
conflict between confidentiality and a police power statute (3) where there is a
judicially or legislatively imposed duty to warn a third party of an individual's
foreseeable danger.
3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 12.37, at 106
n.655 (1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
17. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
18. California Civil Code § 43.92(b)-enacted after the Tarasoff decision-actually
limits the therapist's duty to "making reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the
victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency." CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92(b) (West
1995). The broader language of Tarasoff is as follows:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist
to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case.
Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
19. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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PALMER
But is this really a Tarasoff situation?, I always thought the
Thrasoff duty only applied where the patient threatens to
harm somebody in the future. The therapist is supposed to
tell the police about the threat and warn the victim, so the
harm can be prevented. But Ben hasn't threatened to kill or
harm anyone.' ° He confessed that he committed a murder
in the past. The victim can't be warned because he's already
dead.
COSTELLO
What about Frank Smith, the innocent guy about to be
executed? Isn't he a "victim" of "future harm"? The crime
of murder may be a past crime, but the language of Tarasoff
refers to future danger, not just future "crimes."21
PALMER
But Ben isn't going to kill Frank Smith. The state will.
COSTELLO
For there to be a Tarasoff duty, does it matter if the danger
or harm won't be caused directly by the patient's own hand?
What if you had a patient who was a Mafia boss, and he told
you: "My orders, unless recalled, will be carried out by my
agent. I said to kill A, B, and C. A and B are already dead.
I could stop the killing of C by a phone call, but I won't.
20. Charles J. Meyers states:
Normally a patient's confession of past wrongdoing is confidential information
that a psychotherapist is bound to keep secret . .. . [M]urder is not an
exception. A confession of an intention to commit murder, however, could be
the basis for a legal and ethical breach of confidentiality in the form of a
Tarasoff warning to the potential victim and the police; and the same statement
of intent to commit murder, [could] form ... the basis of an exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Charles J. Meyers, Where the Protective Privilege Ends: California Changes the Rules for
Dangerous Psychotherapy Patients, J. PSYCHIATRY & L., Spring-Summer 1991, at 5, 7.
21. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (West 1995) (stating that there's no privilege
if a lawyer reasonably believes disclosure of a communication is necessary to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm)
with CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1995) (codifying the dangerous patient exception to
psychotherapist-patient privilege, stating that no privilege exists if a therapist has
reasonable cause to believe disclosure of a communication is necessary to prevent the
threatened danger).
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This is exactly how, when and by whom C will be killed.
PALMER
I can see making a Tarasoff disclosure in that case, because
even though my Mafia patient wouldn't be pulling the
trigger, he would really be causing the death of C. But there
the patient wants C to die. Ben doesn't want the state to
execute Frank Smith. The state isn't Ben's henchman like
the Mafia boss's killer.
COSTELLO
Well, let's try another hypothetical. Is Ben more compara-
ble to a patient who says, "I put lethal poison in a jar of
soup in the refrigerator at home. A, not knowing about the
poison, will heat it up for B next Friday-she always serves
soup for B on Friday-unless I go there and get the jar. But
I'm not going to."
PALMER
There the harm is still in the future but it was caused by a
past act of the patient's-plus I guess by the patient's failure
to act in the future. That's more like Ben. Smith will be
executed by the "innocent" state because of Ben's past act
and his future failure to act.
Hey, this really makes sense to me. I seem to remem-
ber back in my ethics training that there wasn't any problem
disclosing a patient's confession that he planted a bomb that
would go off in a hospital. The wrong act would have been
planting the bomb, and it would have been done in the past,
but since the harm had not yet occurred, it was OK to
disclose.l This seems like the same thing to me here.
22. "[I]f a patient tells a doctor in confidence that he has brought a time bomb into
the hopsital and hidden it under the bed of one of his patients, 'it would be a strange
doctor indeed who would feel that his professional confidence should not be violated."'
Brian Domb, Note, I Shot the Sheriff, But Only My Analyst Knows: Shrinking the
Psychotherapist Patient Privilege, 5 J. L. & HEALTH (1990-1991) 209, 223 n.102 (quoting
K. MENNINGER, A MANUAL FOR PSYCHIATRIC CASE STUDY 36 (1960)).
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COSTELLO
Exactly! You're getting good at this. Have you ever
considered going to law school?
PALMER
Oh, I've got enough stress in my life as it is. You've
convinced me I have a Tarasoff duty and have to call the
police and the victim. How do I contact Frank Smith?
COSTELLO
You probably couldn't contact Frank Smith directly on death
row. You could, however, contact his attorney. As a
practical matter, the attorney is representing Frank Smith's
interests and will likely act on your information to stop the
execution.
PALMER
When I call the attorney and the police, what do I say?
How much can I tell them?
COSTELLO
Good question. Under Tarasoff the therapist has a duty
only to disclose the communications that are necessary to
prevent the harm.3 What kind of information here is
necessary to get the police to understand the danger?
First, what is Ben's "confidential communication?" "I
killed X?" or "Y will be executed next Friday for a crime I
committed?" How about "and I'm not going to do anything
to stop it from happening?"
"I killed Y" is not enough to justify a Tarasoff
warning. We are arguing that the threat to Frank Smith is
caused by Ben's past act plus his failure to take action-turn
himself in-to stop the consequent future harm. "Warning"
Frank Smith or Frank Smith's lawyer that Smith's about to
23. The court held that:
[Tihe therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a
confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy
of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the
threatened danger.
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
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be wrongfully executed makes no sense; he knows that.
Warning the police that Frank Smith is about to be wrong-
fully executed similarly makes no sense without the essential
components of Ben's confession and Ben's statement that he
is not going to do anything to prevent the execution. If our
interpretation of Tarasoff is correct, you should say that Ben
Jones is a danger to Frank Smith because he is the murderer
and he is not going to act to prevent Smith's wrongful
execution.
You need to disclose enough so that they understand
the danger and can act to avoid it-which here might involve
informing the district attorney or the governor of the
existence of Ben's confession. But of course you have a
continuing duty to preserve the confidentiality of all the rest
of Ben's confidential communications with you. If and when
Ben is prosecuted for the murder, and you are called to
testify against him, the "dangerous patient" exception will
apply only as to the information you disclosed to the police
and the communications which caused you to reasonably
conclude that Ben was dangerous.24
'PALMER
When Ben left me yesterday he was still deciding what to
do. He might turn himself in after all. Does my Tarasoff
duty exist before I'm sure that he's not going to turn himself
in?
24. If a therapist delivers a Tarasoff warning about a patient, the dangerous patient
exception applies to the communication about the danger-for example the language the
therapist uses to warn the potential victim and whatever other language or observations
by the therapist that gave rise to the "reasonable suspicion" that the patient was
dangerous. All other communications remain privileged, unless they qualify for some
other exception. Menendez v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 435, 455, 834 P.2d 786, 798, 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 104 (1992). In People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194
Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983), a child-patient disclosed evidence of sexual abuse to a therapist, who
reported the disclosure as required by statute. The stepparent molester, who was also
patient of the therapist, subsequently confessed to the therapist. The therapist, relying on
incorrect legal advice from the police that she had a duty to do so, disclosed the
confession. The court held no privilege existed as to the child's statement because it was
correctly reported pursuant to a legal duty, but the stepparent's privilege was not
eliminated under the "child abuse exception" since the therapist's disclosure was not in
fact required by law. Id. at 514, 668 P.2d at 744-45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
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COSTELLO
Do you reasonably think he might not turn himself in? That
he'll let Frank Smith be executed? Reasonable assessment
of dangerousness is the standard under Tarasoff, that triggers
the duty and qualifies the dangerous patient exception. You
don't have to be correct in your belief that the patient is
dangerous, only reasonable.'
PALMER
I still don't understand how this dangerous patient exception
works. Suppose I do call the police and tell them what you
suggested. Then later they charge Ben with the murder, and
they call me to testify to his confession. Is there no way he
or I can object to my testifying?
COSTELLO
The patient, not the therapist, is the holder of the privilege,
so when you are called to testify it will be up to Ben to
assert the privilege.2 6 The prosecution will then have to
show that the dangerous patient exception applies to the
communications they want to ask you about. But that
shouldn't be hard for them. Once you have made a Thrasoff
disclosure, the "factual predicate" has been satisfied for the
"dangerous patient" exception.
25. [T]he requisite "reasonable cause to believe" must be determined in light of
the standards of the psychotherapeutic community. The test is objective, but
takes account of all the relevant circumstances; it is based on the norms
prevailing among psychotherapists as a group, but allows broad discretion to the
individual psychotherapist.
Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 451, 834 P.2d at 795, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101. Although expert
testimony may be necessary to determine the standard of care-if the issue is whether a
therapist should have realized that a Tarasoff duty existed-the court can find that the
dangerous patient exception applies even without expert assistance "where the patient has
made an actual threat of violence or the therapist has actually determined that the patient
posed such a danger." Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 605, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 733 (1980).
26. The California Evidence Code provides that the "holder of the privilege" is "[t]he
patient when he has no guardian or conservator." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1013(a) (West
1995). It is well established that the therapist has no independent right to assert the
privilege if the patient or the patient's representative has waived the privilege. See In re
Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
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PALMER
So there's no way I can give a Thrasoff disclosure to prevent
Smith's execution without also having my testimony about
Ben's confession qualify for the dangerous patient excep-
tion?
COSTELLO
Right. In fact, even if you had only decided that your
Tarasoff duty existed, and you never got around to actually
making the disclosure, the dangerous patient exception
would still apply to any communications by Ben which had
convinced you he was dangerous. The California Supreme
Court in a case called People v. Wharton27 made it plain
that the dangerous patient exception was "not keyed to...
disclosure" or warning, but to the "existence of the specified
factual predicate," that is, the therapist's reasonable cause
for belief in the dangerousness of the patient and the
necessity of disclosure.' So if somehow the prosecution
learned from another source that Ben had confessed the
murder to you, and also that you had decided that Ben was
dangerous and had planned to make a Tarasoff disclosure,
they could still obtain your testimony under the dangerous
patient exception by proving the factual predicate existed.29
PALMER
But if I don't make a Tarasoff disclosure, and the prosecu-
tion calls me, how can they prove the factual predicate
existed?
27. 53 Cal. 3d 522, 809 P.2d 290, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991).
28. Id at 560-61, 809 P.2d at 313, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
29. For example, in People v. Hopkins, 44 Cal. App. 3d 669, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1975),
the defendant was charged with burglary and robbery. On the same day of the offense,
the defendant, a veteran with an alcohol problem, confessed his part in the crime to a
psychiatrist at the Veteran's Administration (VA) hospital. The prosecutor called the VA
psychiatrist to testify to the confession. The court found that the confession was not
privileged under California Evidence Code § 1024 because the VA psychiatrist had
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was dangerous and that disclosure of the
confession was necessary to prevent the threatened danger.
The court in Mavroudis, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 603, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (1980), relied
on Hopkins as "authority... for a retrospective application of" California Evidence Code
§ 1024.
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COSTELLO
I suppose they could try to show, using the objective
standard, that a reasonable therapist in your position,
hearing Ben's confession, would have concluded that he was
dangerous to Frank Smith and that disclosure was necessary
to prevent Smith's wrongful execution."
PALMER
But would a reasonable therapist even think about the
execution of Smith as a Tarasoff-type future harm? I mean,
it makes sense to me, but I'm not sure it will to anybody
else.
COSTELLO
No, we may be totally wrong in our analysis-or at least so
far away from the general understanding of Tarasoff that our
theory wouldn't occur to the prosecution.31 But I'm sure a
simpler theory will, in light of the Menendez case: That you,
as a reasonable therapist, should believe that Ben Jones is
dangerous to someone other than Frank Smith, and that
disclosure of Ben's confession is necessary to protect that
person.
PALMER
I guess, since Ben has killed before, he may be more likely
to kill again, and so he is dangerous in that sense. But
Tarasoff disclosures usually are only required when there is
an identifiable victim or small group of victims, like family
30. This was the approach used in Mavroudis, where the court authorized in camera
inspection of the defendant's therapist's records to determine whether the therapist had
a duty to disclose. Such a duty existed if prior to the time the patient injured the
plaintiffs, the therapist had determined or reasonably should have determined that the
patient presented a serious danger of violence to the plaintiffs. Mavroudis, 10 Cal. App.
3d at 605-06, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33.
31. If we were wrong in our analysis, and Palmer-relying on my incorrect ad-
vice-disclosed Ben's confession, it's remotely possible that in a later prosecution of Ben
a court would rule that the dangerous patient exception didn't apply to Ben's confession
to Palmer. But under People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 512-13, 668 P.2d 738, 743, 194
Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (1983), that's a long shot. I think we would have to assume that, if
Palmer made a disclosure based on a mistaken Tarsoff theory, a court would find that
§ 1024 applies.
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members; you don't have to call the police to say "my
patient X might hurt somebody sometime."
COSTELLO
You're fight, you don't.32 But here there's an obvious
target of Ben's potential violence: You.
PALMER
Me? But Ben's never threatened me.
COSTELLO
What do you think would happen if you told him you were
going to turn him into the police? Do you think he'd kill
you to prevent that? Or at least threaten violence to try to
frighten you into silence?
PALMER
He might.
COSTELLO
The minute he does, you've got the factual predicate for a
Tarasoff disclosure and a dangerous patient exception.
The California Supreme Court said in Menendez that the
dangerous patient exception "does not demand that the
patient must be dangerous to a person other than the
psychotherapist."33 In that case the court found that the
dangerous patient exception applied to notes that Dr. Oziel
took of two therapy sessions with defendants Lyle and Erik
Menendez. Lyle and Erik had confessed to Dr. Oziel that
they killed their parentsO The trial court had made factual
32. The intended victim need not be specifically named by the patient, but must be
readily identifiable. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 25 n.11. In Tarasoff the court recognized that it would be unreasonable to expect the
therapist to interrogate the patient or to conduct an investigation to discover the identity
of the patient's intended victim. Mavroudis, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 600,162 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
33. Menendez v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 435, 451, 834 P.2d 786, 796, 11 Cal. Rptr.
2d 92, 102 (1992).
34. Id at 450, 834 P.2d at 795, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
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findings that, during those sessions, Lyle and Erik had
threatened Dr. Oziel's life.
35
PALMER
So if I tell Ben that I may turn him in, and he threatens me,
can I then disclose both his threats and his confession?
COSTELLO
Under Menendez and Wharton I believe you can, because as
soon as the factual predicate was satisfied-you reasonably
perceived Ben was dangerous to you and that disclosure was
necessary to protect yourself-the dangerous patient
exception applies. By the way, do you share offices with
anybody or live with anybody? If so, you may share Dr.
Oziel's concern that, if you're in danger, those closest to you
may also be in danger. You can make a disclosure to them
of your fear of Ben and the reason for it-that is, Ben's
confession. Doing so will reinforce the evidence for the
factual predicate, even though, as I told you, under Wharton
you don't actually need to have warned anybody for the
dangerous patient exception to apply.
PALMER
What if Ben doesn't actually threaten me, but just looks very
upset and angry? I used to think he was pretty harmless,
but now that I know he's a murderer, it wouldn't take much
to make me afraid of him.
COSTELLO
Although in Menendez the patients did make explicit threats
to Dr. Oziel, neither the Thrasoff duty nor the dangerous
patient exception requires an explicit utterance of a threat or
intent to harm. The factual predicate begins when the
therapist reasonably believes the patient is dangerous. And
of course a therapist could reach such a conclusion even if
the patient never uttered a threat, based upon the patient's
past behavior and other information obtained during
35. During those sessions, Lyle and Erik "made threats of harm that were aimed at
him alone but also collaterally endangered his wife, Laurel Oziel, and his lover, Judalon
Smyth, because of their relationships." Id. at 444, 834 P.2d at 791, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
L.A. LAW SCHOOL
therapy. For instance, a patient who couldn't accept his own
violent feelings toward a potential victim might well say, "I'd
never hurt X. I love X. X is like my other halt" But the
therapist, assessing all the information about that patient,
could reasonably decide that Xis in danger from the patient.
So even if Ben doesn't explicitly threaten you, if you have
enough other information to make a reasonable assessment
of dangerousness and the need to disclose to prevent harm,
Tarasoff and the dangerous patient exception apply.
PALMER
The more I think about it, the more I don't like the idea of
confronting Ben. He might not just threaten to kill me-he
might just go ahead and do it!
COSTELLO
I hate to put it this way, but you need to set Ben up. You
need to put him in a situation where he threatens you, or
where your perception of danger is reasonable, so you can
disclose. But you want to discourage him from killing you
right on the spot. How about putting all the information
about his confession and your plans to confront him and
urge him to turn himself in on tape or in a letter. Give the
tape or letter to your lawyer, that's still privileged, and tell
Ben it will be released as of a certain day if by then he
hasn't turned himself in. And tell Ben further that you've
set up a schedule to call in to your lawyer, and if you fail to
do so, because, for instance, something bad had happened to
you, the tape or letter will instantly be sent to the police.
PALMER
That sounds good. If he turns himself in, that would be the
best thing. But whether he confesses, or the tape/letter is
sent to the police, an innocent person won't die. And since
Ben knows the disclosure will be made whether I'm dead or
alive, he'll have no incentive to kill me.
COSTELLO
Unless he's so furious at what he may see as your betrayal
of his trust that he can't control himself
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PALMER
Oh, it really does feel like that. Like I'm betraying his trust.
And I was trained, and I really believe that my loyalty
should be to my patient. But don't I have a duty to Frank
Smith, even though I don't know him, or to society?
COSTELLO
All the commentaries on professional ethical codes add some
mushy language about the therapist's discretion to weigh the
interests of patient versus those of society.36 In Menendez
and Wharton the court says the California legislature has
done this same balancing of interests, and so established the
Tarasoff duty and the California Evidence Code section 1024
dangerous patient exception.37 Arguably since ethics codes
allow you some discretion, if you choose the same balance
of interests and reach the same conclusion as the California
legislature, this is not obviously wrong and should not
subject you to discipline."
We've discussed all the ways in which you may disclose
if you want to-either by coming up with a persuasive
argument that Tarasoff can be stretched to cover these facts
with Frank Smith as the victim, or by confronting Ben so
that he may be dangerous to you, so that you are the victim.
If you go either route, I think you'll satisfy the APA ethical
code. Certainly you won't have to worry about Ben
successfully suing you for violating his confidentiality or
36. Winslade & Ross, supra note 6, at 606-14. For example, the American Psycho-
logical Association's Confidentiality Principle permits disclosure " 'in those unusual circum-
stances in which not to do so would result in clear danger to the person or others.'" Id.
at 607 (citing Principle 5 in Am. Psychological Ass'n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists,
36 THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 633, 635-36 (1981)). The American Psychoanalytic
Association's Principles of Ethics for Psychoanalysts gives professional discretion to
disclose "'when the interests of the patient conflict with the welfare of the community at
large."' Id. at 608 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF
ETHICS FOR PSYCHOANALYSTS AND PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF ETHICS FOR PSYCHOANALYSTS § 2 (1983)).
37. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 452, 834 P.2d at 796, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (1992) (citing
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 441 n.13, 551 P.2d 334, 347 n.13,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 n.13); People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 561-62, 809 P.2d 290, 313,
280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 654 (1991)).
38. It would be helpful to know whether the therapist in Strizinger who relied on
inaccurate legal advice from the police-and so made an unnecessary disclosure of the
stepparent's confession-was later sanctioned.
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privacy rights. Since you disclosed under requirement of
law, there is no violation because Ben didn't have the right
to keep that secret.39
On the other hand, if you want to keep Ben's confes-
sion confidential, you can just keep quiet about it. Unless
Ben discloses to somebody in a nonconfidential,
nonprivileged context, the chances are slim that you'll ever
be subpoenaed.
PALMER
But what if that does happen-I don't disclose, but the
prosecutor calls me to testify. And Ben asserts the privilege,
and for some reason the prosecutor doesn't succeed in
proving that the dangerous patient exception applies. Can
the judge just say "we need the information anyway, in the
interests of justice" or something like that, and compel me
to testify?
COSTELLO
No, that's one way in which the privilege is still strong in
California. In Menendez the prosecution tried to apply that
argument to communications made to Dr. Oziel which the
court had found did not qualify under the dangerous patient
exception, asserting the People's right to truth finding in
legal proceedings under the state constitution4 outweighed
the defendant's right to privacy. The Menendez court
rejected the argument, pointing out that the state legislature
established an exception to physician-patient privilege for
criminal cases, but did not do this for psychotherapist-patient
39. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840 n.2, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 n.2
(1986) (noting that disclosure based on the duty to warn others and dangerous patient
exception was available as an affirmative defense in an action by patient for damages);
People v. Gomez, 134 Cal. App. 3d 874, 881, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1982) (finding no
violation of patient's right of privacy to report threats pursuant to Tarasoff and stating
"any privilege, even as to a psychiatrist.., was negated by section 1024").
40. The prosecution relied on the California Constitution, Article I, § 29, which
provides that "[i]n a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to
due process of law... " and on California Constitution Article I, § 28, which establishes
the People's right to truth in evidence. Menendez, 3 Cal. 4th at 456-57 n.18, 834 P.2d at
799 n.18, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105 n.18.
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privilege.41 Unless Ben waives the privilege, or the court
finds no privilege under California Evidence Code section
1024, I don't believe you could be forced to testify about
Ben's confession.42 And here's a very important point to
remember: If you are subpoenaed, wait until the judge rules
that there is no privilege and that you have to testify: Don't
volunteer! That's the one way in which you surely could
make yourself liable for damages to Ben.43
PALMER
This is getting all so tortured and complicated. If the state
wants me to testify about threats by patients, or confessions
by patients, why don't they just eliminate the privilege?
COSTELLO
Well, we as a society want to have our cake and eat it too.
The legislature recognizes a privilege in order to encourage
people to get help and not do harm, but if they do harm
anyway we want to nail them. So we establish a constitu-
tional right to confidentiality/privacy but at the same time
tell therapists they have a duty to predict dangerousness and
to prevent harm. If as part of preventing harm, they want
to involuntarily hospitalize the patient, of course they need
to be able to testify against the patient in commitment
41. "As a general matter at least, the privilege appears paramount to prosecution."
Ld. at 456 n.18, 834 P.2d at 799 n.18, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 105 n.18. The court also rejected the
prosecution's argument that the People's state constitutional right to truth in evidence
trumped the privilege. Id.
42. Some commentators have suggested that the state may have a compelling interest
in overriding privilege to get to murder confession of past crimes where they have resulted
from compulsive behavior or addictions likely to result in future crimes as well.
Dean Smith has argued that after the commission of a crime, presumably
including homicide, the state's interest in obtaining what amounts to a confession
to the therapist is weak because, at that point, the state can no longer prevent
the crime's commission. Theoretically, though, the argument could be made that
some criminal behavior is prone to repetition just like child abuse, and should
be an exception to the privilege if the crime is outrageous enough to society's
sensibilities-such as homicide.
Domb, supra note 22, at 234 n.176 (citing Steven Smith, Constitutional Privacy in
Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 55 (1980)).
43. "[A] psychotherapist who volunteers information concerning a patient obtained
in connection with their relationship, does so at his or her peril." Cutter, 183 Cal. App.
3d at 847, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
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proceedings. So we establish a privilege exception for
that." But what if, despite these precautions, some terrible
harm, such as a murder, occurs? If the patient, now a
criminal defendant, pleads insanity or puts mental condition
at issue as a defense, naturally the state will want privilege
exceptions for that, and indeed, these exist.45 But what if
the defendant does not put mental state at issue or introduce
a psychiatric defense; how is the prosecution to obtain the
.testimony of the therapist against the patient? The court in
Wharton found a way, by applying the dangerous patient
exception to statements made by the defendant before the
murder of the victim, but after disclosure of those statements
could prevent harm to the victim.' In Wharton, the defen-
dant's therapists had indeed made Tarasoff warnings to the
victim, so the requisite factual predicate was satisfied for
California Evidence Code section 1024. But what if the
therapists never made a Tarasoff warning, indeed, never
thought of making one? Wharton suggests that they should
have known, and if the prosecution can prove that, the
dangerous patient exception will apply. But why make the
prosecution prove it? The courts soon will be tempted to
take the logical next step: The retroactive assumption that
a killer must have been dangerous enough to warrant a
Tarasoff warning in the past, whether the therapist actually
realized it or not. Using that logic, there eventually will be
44. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1995) (dangerous patient exception) and CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1025 (West 1995) (no privilege in competency proceeding).
45. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1016 (West 1995) (no privilege for tender of issue of mental
or emotional condition) and CAL. EVID. CODE § 1023 (West 1995) (no privilege in
criminal sanity proceeding).
46. According to Justice Stanley Mosk, the court in Wharton "misconstrued the
pertinent statutory provisions with mischievous effect." Stanley Mosk, Psychotherapist and
Patient in the California Supreme Court: Ground Lost and Ground Regained, 20 PEPP. L.
REv. 415, 415 (1993). "[T]he Wharton majority erroneously construed the 'dangerous
patient' exception so as to effectively abolish the crucial requirement that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to prevent threatened harm." Id. at 420. In Wharton, prior to
committing the murder, the defendant had told both of his therapists that he planned to
kill the victim. People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 549, 809 P.2d 290, 304, 280 Cal. Rptr.
631, 645 (1991). Both therapists warned the eventual victim and testified at trial about the
defendant's threatening statements. The Wharton court found the "dangerous patient
exception" applied to defendant's threats, even though the victim was now dead and
disclosure of the threats by the therapist was not necessary to prevent future harm. Id. at
562, 809 P.2d at 314, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
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no therapist-patient privilege for any criminal defendant
charged with a violent crime.
But that's not where the case law in California stands
today. Wharton and Menendez don't say there is no
privilege as to past crimes, or no privilege in criminal
proceedings, period. However, the fact patterns in those two
cases give therapists who want to disclose-or prosecutors
who want to show that section 1024 applies-a blueprint for
satisfying the factual predicate.
PALMER
Well all this is very interesting, and I'm really glad I talked
to a law professor to get such an in depth explanation. But
I've got a lot of thinking to do. Could you maybe just sum
up your advice?
COSTELLO
Sure. If you decide not to disclose the confession, don't ask
Ben any further about it, don't create any factual predicate
to justify a warning-no dangerous patient exception. And
hope that a prosecutor never learns about Ben's confession
to you.
If you do want to tell, Menendez gives you a blueprint
as to how to do it. Let me know if you decide to go with
the tape or letter route.
PALMER
Thanks, I will. It's a terrible burden, this knowledge of
Ben's confession. I feel better just having shared it with
you.
PALMER leaves the office and COSTELLO is left alone.
COSTELLO
So Dr. Palmer is my client and she has told me about Ben's
confession and that Frank Smith will be executed for Ben's
crime. If she decides to disclose Ben's confession, I don't
have a problem. But what if she doesn't? What do I do
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then? I think I need some good ethical advice-I wonder if
Kay Tate is still here?47
COSTELLO picks up the phone and punches four numbers.
COSTELLO
Kay, do you have a few minutes?
FADE OUT
47. For Professor Tate's opinion, see Kathryn W. Tate, The Hypothetical as a Teaching
Tool, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv 1659 (1996).
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